Is the Whole Point of Human Rights Their Universal Character? A, B & C v Ireland and SAS v France by Burke, Abbey
  
Abbey Burke 
Is the Whole Point of Human Rights Their 
Universal Character? A, B & C v Ireland and 
SAS v France 
Article (Published version) 
(Refereed) 
 
 
 
Original citation: 
Burke, Abbey (2018) Is the Whole Point of Human Rights Their Universal Character? A, B & C v 
Ireland and SAS v France. LSE Law Review, 3. pp. 45-56. 
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21953/lse.b6cr3y1wfb5b  
 
© 2018 LSE Law Society 
 
This version available at: http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/88099/  
Available in LSE Research Online: May 2018 
 
LSE has developed LSE Research Online so that users may access the research output of the 
School. Copyright © and Moral Rights for the papers on this site are retained by the individual 
authors and/or other copyright owners. Users may download and/or print one copy of any 
article(s) in LSE Research Online to facilitate their private study or for non-commercial research. 
You may not engage in further distribution of the material or use it for any profit-making activities 
or any commercial gain. You may freely distribute the URL (http://eprints.lse.ac.uk) of the LSE 
Research Online website.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For more research by LSE authors go to LSE Research Online   
 
2018 LSE LAW REVIEW 45 
 
Is the Whole Point of Human Rights Their Universal 
Character? A, B & C v Ireland and SAS v France 
 
Abbey Burke* 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT  
The United Kingdom Supreme Court’s 2014 decision in Cheshire West concerned the question 
of whether living arrangements for certain mentally incapacitated persons amounted to a 
deprivation of liberty. In finding that the test for whether someone has been deprived of their 
liberty is the same for a disabled person as it is for everyone else, Lady Hale reminded the Court 
that human rights are for everyone, because ‘[t]he whole point of human rights is their universal 
character’.1 But is there such a thing as universal human rights? This paper considers the 
philosophical and institutional complications faced by a universal approach to human rights. It 
argues that these philosophical and institutional difficulties are clearly played out in two recent 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights: A, B & C v Ireland,2 concerning the 
Republic of Ireland’s restrictions on abortion, and SAS v France,3 concerning France’s ban on 
face-coverings. It concludes that the Court must not stray too far from a universal approach to 
human rights, lest it blot its record of success in calling out violations of rights and protecting 
individuals from the illiberal excesses of government.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In the United Kingdom (‘UK’) Supreme Court’s Cheshire West judgment on 
whether living arrangements for mentally incapacitated persons amounted to a 
deprivation of liberty, Lady Hale reminded the Court that ‘[t]he whole point of 
                                                             
* I am a qualified Australian solicitor, currently completing a Master of Laws (Public Law) 
at the London School of Economics. Prior to commencing at LSE, I completed a 
combined bachelor’s degree in Law and Arts at the University of New South Wales, for 
which I received a Distinction average and Honours. 
1 Cheshire West and Chester Council v P and another [2014] AC 896 (SC) [36]. 
2 [2010] ECHR 2032. 
3 [2014] ECHR 695. 
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human rights is their universal character’.4 ‘[H]uman rights are for everyone’, Lady 
Hale observed, because they are ‘premised on the inherent dignity of all human 
beings’.5 These statements demonstrate the rhetorical power of rights as a tool to 
cut through complexity and bureaucratic obscurantism. As Conor Gearty has 
observed, legal analysis that starts from the fact of a right may achieve better 
outcomes for individuals than when the Court’s primary focus is the conduct of 
the defendants.6 However, Lady Hale’s statements regarding the universal 
character of human rights may belie the difficulty of applying enumerated rights 
to individual cases. Any such difficulty is compounded by applying these rights 
across a fractious community of 820 million citizens in 47 countries. Nonetheless, 
this is the ambitious aim of the European Court of Human Rights (‘Court’).7 This 
paper begins by considering both the philosophical and institutional 
complications faced by a universal approach to human rights. It then suggests that 
the doctrine of States’ margin of appreciation lays bare the Court’s difficulty in 
giving universal meaning to the rights contained in the European Convention of 
Human Rights (‘the Convention’). Finally, examining the Court’s decisions in A, 
B & C v Ireland8 and SAS v France,9 the paper suggests that the Court has, at times, 
demonstrated an excessive deference to the sensibilities of States, which is not 
justifiable on either philosophical grounds (relating to the nature of rights), or on 
institutional grounds (relating to the proper role of the Court). Demonstrating a 
punctilious concern for States’ protection of local morals, traditions, and 
practices, these decisions depart from the Court’s usual proportionality analysis in 
ways that render the reasoning process perfunctory or incoherent. The paper 
suggests that these cases represent unjustifiable departures from a universal 
approach to human rights that prevent the Court from fulfilling its original 
mandate of protecting individuals from the illiberal excesses of government.  
 
 
 
                                                             
4 Cheshire West (n 1) [1]. 
5 ibid [36].  
6 Conor Gearty, On Fantasy Island, Britain Strasbourg and Human Rights (OUP 2016) 136. 
7 Dimitrios Tsarapatsanis, ‘The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine: A Low-Level 
Institutional View’ (2015) 35 Legal Studies 675, 683.  
8 A, B & C v Ireland (n 2). 
9 SAS v France (n 3). 
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I. PHILOSOPHICAL COMPLICATIONS TO A UNIVERSAL 
APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
In SAS v France, dissenting Judges Nussberger and Jäderblom castigate the 
majority’s acceptance of France’s argument that its ban on face coverings pursued 
the legitimate aim of ensuring people could ‘live together’ as an aspect of 
guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of others.10 In doing so, the dissenting 
judges suggest that the majority conclusion ‘sacrifices concrete individual rights 
guaranteed by the Convention to abstract principles.’11 On its face, this statement 
appears odd. What is a right, after all, but an abstract principle? This statement is 
a good starting point for considering some of the philosophical complications 
inherent in the rights enumerated under the Convention.  
 
What Rights-Claims Should Be Recognised?  
As seen in the dissenting judgment in SAS v France, one complication to a 
universal approach to human rights lies in identifying which rights-claims to 
recognise at all. George Letsas demonstrates this difficulty in his argument 
regarding the difference between prima facie and pro tanto rights.12 Letsas criticises 
the Chamber’s finding in Hatton v United Kingdom13 (later reversed by the Grand 
Chamber) that Heathrow Airport’s night flight-scheme amounted to a violation 
of the applicant’s right to family life under Article 8 of the Convention.14 ‘There 
is no such thing’, Letsas writes, ‘as a pro tanto right to sleep well at night, free 
from the noise interference that it was reasonable to expect will affect properties 
near airports.’15 Similarly, in IA v Turkey,16 Letsas suggests that the Court reached 
a false diagnosis because it balanced a real, pro tanto right (to publish on religious 
matters) against a pseudo-right (not to be offended by blasphemous 
publications).17 However, in penumbral cases, where the Court is considering 
whether or not to extend Convention protections to a novel claim, the utility of 
                                                             
10 ibid [5] (Nussberger and Jäderblom JJ). 
11 ibid [2] (Nussberger and Jäderblom JJ). 
12 George Letsas, ‘The Scope and Balancing of Rights’ in Eva Brems and Janneke Gerards 
(eds), Shaping Rights in the ECHR (CUP 2014) 48. 
13 [2001] ECHR 565. 
14 Letsas (n 12) 57. 
15 ibid.  
16 [2005] ECHR 590. 
17 Letsas (n 12) 57-58.  
 
48 Is the Whole Point of Human Rights Their Universal Character? Vol. 3 
 
Letsas’ schema is questionable. What appears to be missing is clear guidance on 
how to distinguish a ‘real’ convention right from a ‘pseudo’ right. 
 
How to Balance Competing Rights?  
A second philosophical complication to a universal approach to human rights lies 
in the Court’s need to balance Convention rights that routinely come into conflict, 
such as the rights to private life under Article 8 and freedom of expression under 
Article 10. The difficulty experienced by the Court in taking a consistent approach 
to such rights-balancing cases is seen in the Court’s divergent (although 
simultaneous) decisions in Von Hannover v Germany (No 2)18 and Axel Springer AG 
v Germany.19 In Von Hannover, in determining the breadth of the margin of 
appreciation to be extended in relation to the refusal of German domestic courts 
to injunct photographs of the Princess of Monaco, the Court reasoned that the 
outcome of the application should not, in theory, vary according to whether it 
was lodged under Article 8 or 10, because ‘as a matter of principle these rights 
deserve equal respect.’20 Therefore, Germany’s margin of appreciation should, in 
theory, be the same in relation to both articles. As the German courts had 
undertaken the requisite balancing process between freedom of expression and 
privacy by applying criteria identified by the Court for balancing those rights, the 
principle of subsidiarity meant that the domestic court’s decision should stand.21 
However, on the same day as the Von Hannover decision, in Axel Springer the Court 
handed down a decision that appears to depart from the discipline imposed on 
itself in Von Hannover, finding that the media company’s right to freedom of 
expression had been breached by an injunction preventing publication of a story 
about an actor’s conviction for drug possession. The majority judges reached this 
conclusion without finding fault with the balancing process the domestic court 
had engaged in. Axel Springer shows that when a public figure is involved, judges 
will often rank the demands of freedom of expression higher than those of 
privacy, showing the artificiality of any assertion that Convention rights must 
carry equal weight. The Court’s divergent approaches to balancing rights in these 
simultaneously decided cases shows how unpredictable the doctrine of margin of 
appreciation and its flip-side, European supervision, can be in practice.  
                                                             
18 [2012] ECHR 228. 
19 [2012] ECHR 227. 
20 Von Hannover (n 18) [106]. 
21 ibid [106]-[107].  
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How to Weigh Rights-Claims Against Other Interests and Goals?  
A third complication lies in the fact that in human rights jurisprudence, as in 
political life, it is often considered appropriate that individual rights give way to 
public goals such as the protection of safety, morals, economic well-being, or 
health. This can be seen in two examples. In James v United Kingdom,22 the Court 
held that legislation granting long term tenants the right to buy their homes did 
not violate landlords’ Convention right to property, and the England and Wales 
Court of Appeal found no violation of the same right in the context of a ban on 
cigarette vending machines in the case of R (Sinclair Collis Ltd) v Secretary of State for 
Health.23 While an earlier generation of rights instruments obscured this 
complexity by framing rights in absolute terms (see eg the First Amendment to 
the US Constitution), rights under the Convention frequently wear their 
complexity on their sleeve by including a list of ways in which the right may be 
restricted where ‘necessary in a democratic society’. When interpreting this phrase, 
as it appears in Articles 8-11 of the Convention, the Court applies a multi-stage 
proportionality analysis, asking: (1) whether the State’s interference with the right 
is in pursuit of a legitimate aim; (2) whether the measure is capable of achieving 
that aim; (3) whether the measure is the least restrictive measure that could achieve 
the aim; and (4) whether the advantage of pursuing the aim outweighs the costs 
to the right.24 As argued in section 4 in relation to A, B & C v Ireland and SAS v 
France, it is only through a thorough and careful application of the proportionality 
analysis that the Court can work through this third philosophical complication to 
a universal approach to human rights. As a deliberative process, proportionality 
allows the Court to give proper weight to the right itself and to appropriately 
sanction State laws which, even allowing for reasonable disagreement between 
States, clearly emerge as arbitrary or excessively burdensome on individuals.  
 
Rights as Creatures of Intuition, Assertion and Recognition 
The three philosophical complications discussed above tend toward a conclusion 
that rights are moral and political, rather than something that is objectively 
discovered by the Court using faculties of faith or reason. The content of rights, 
and their imperviousness or otherwise to completing claims, is a matter of 
                                                             
22 [1986] ECHR 2. 
23 [2012] QB 394. 
24 Julian Rivers, ‘The Presumption of Proportionality’ (2014) 77 MLR 409, 412. 
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intuition, assertion, and community recognition. The last-mentioned 
characteristic can be seen in the Court’s frequent reference to an emerging 
European consensus in vindicating rights-claims of individuals in novel 
circumstances.25 The Court’s survey of domestic laws under the doctrine of 
consensus sits uneasily with the belief that a primary function of courts is to 
provide a check on majority desires in defence of minorities. However, when 
faced with the difficulty of determining whether to condemn the actions of States 
for the first time, observing that a strong majority of States have turned away from 
a particular practice (such as, eg, criminalising homosexuality) may give judges 
confidence that their own intuitions are shared more broadly. In this way, the 
Court may plausibly conclude that a Convention right has extended (or perhaps, 
in some future instance, retracted) so that its content is different from that 
previously articulated in judicial guidance. 
 
II. INSTITUTIONAL COMPLICATIONS TO A UNIVERSAL 
APPROACH TO HUMAN RIGHTS 
 
The institutional character of the Court as a supranational tribunal presents 
further difficulties for a universal approach to human rights. According to 
Tsarapatsanis, the doctrine of States’ margin of appreciation is a mechanism the 
Court uses to ‘underenforce’ human rights, short of an optimal substantive 
understanding of those rights.26 This is justified, he suggests, because under the 
machinery of the Convention, protecting human rights is a cooperative venture 
between the Court and States Parties.27 In a similar vein, the former President of 
the Court, Dean Spielmann, argues that the margin of appreciation is essential to 
protecting rights, because it provides an incentive for States to engage in the 
necessary Convention review, thereby building their capacity to be effective 
protectors of rights within their own jurisdictions.28 Affording States a margin of 
appreciation regarding the content of, and necessary restrictions on, rights, is 
further justified, according to Tsarapatsanis, because there are some issues, such 
as economic policy, that the Court is not as well placed to make decisions about, 
                                                             
25 See eg the Court’s recognition of transgender rights in Goodwin v United Kingdom [2002] 
ECHR 588. 
26 Tsarapatsanis (n 7) 675. 
27 ibid 678. 
28 Dean Spielmann, ‘Whither the Margin of Appreciation?’ (2014) 67 CLP 49, 63. 
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given its particular technical expertise, limited resources, and constrained 
timelines.29 Courts recognise that they may, just as much as governments, get 
things wrong (‘bounded rationality’) or that there might be room for reasonable 
disagreement.30 These institutional factors, according to Tsarapatsanis, justify the 
Court’s ‘incremental and deferential approach’ to fielding rights-claims.31  
 
III. WHEN IS THE COURT’S INVOCATION OF THE MARGIN OF 
APPRECIATION UNJUSTIFIABLE? 
 
The shared responsibility arguments of Tsarapatsanis and Spielmann are 
persuasive, given the observable reality that the Court’s enforcement powers are 
both politically and mechanically limited. Such enforcement limitations are 
exemplified in high-profile refusals by States to comply with Court decisions, such 
as Azerbaijan’s refusal to release opposition politician Ilgar Mammadov following 
a 2014 ruling against his detention,32 and the UK’s prolonged resistance to the 
Court on the issue of prisoner voting.33 Tsarapatsanis’ hypothesis that Courts take 
appropriate notice of their own resource limitations when asked to consider far-
reaching social and economic policies is also plausible.  In these circumstances, 
when is the Court’s invocation of the margin of appreciation unjustifiable? When, 
in the Court’s case law, has its reasoning justified the criticism of commentators 
that it is ‘a circumlocution’ (Judge Jan de Meyer in Z v Finland),34‘loose’,35‘slippery 
as an eel’36 (Lord Lester), and potentially ‘an abdication of judicial responsibility’.37 
As noted by the majority in A, B & C v Ireland, although the Court considered 
that the margin of appreciation to be accorded to Ireland was ‘crucial’38 to the 
proportionality analysis of Ireland’s abortion laws, that margin was ‘not 
                                                             
29 Tsarapatsanis (n 7) 690-691. 
30 ibid 678. 
31 ibid 684. 
32 Mammadov v Azerbaijan [2014] ECHR 504. 
33 See eg Hirst (No. 2) v United Kingdom [2005] ECHR 681; Greens and MT v United Kingdom 
[2010] ECHR 1826; Firth and Others v United Kingdom [2014] ECHR 874; Millbank and 
Others v United Kingdom [2016] ECHR 595. 
34 Cited in Spielmann (n 28) 54. 
35 Lord Lester of Herne Hill, ‘Universality Versus Subsidiarity: A Reply’ (1998) 1 EHRLR 
73, 75. 
36 ibid 51.  
37 Tsarapatsanis (n 7) 697. 
38 A, B & C v Ireland (n 2) [231]. 
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unlimited’.39 What are its limits? Put another way, when will the Court extend the 
margin of appreciation such that it erodes the universal character of rights?  
 
IV. ABDICATIONS OF RESPONSIBILITY? A, B & C V IRELAND 
AND SAS V FRANCE 
 
Having found that Ireland’s ban on abortion for health or wellbeing reasons 
restricted the first and second applicants’ right to private life under Article 8 (given 
its interference with their personal autonomy, and physical and psychological 
integrity), the Court concluded that the restriction was nonetheless justified on 
the ground that it was necessary in a democratic society.40 In reaching the latter 
conclusion, the Court’s proportionality enquiry was, arguably, rendered otiose by 
its concern for the moral sensibilities of the State. The Court considered that 
Ireland’s restrictive abortion law was in pursuit of a legitimate aim, being the need 
to ‘protect the life of the unborn’, understood as an aspect of the protection of 
morals exception to Article 8.41 Here, the Court relied on the institutional 
argument, articulated in Handyside v United Kingdom,42 that States were in a better 
position than the Court to give an opinion on the requirements of morals, and on 
the necessity of restrictions to meet them, given their ‘direct and continuous 
contact with the vital forces of their countries.’43 The majority repeatedly referred 
to the ‘deep’ and ‘profound’ nature of the beliefs held by the Irish people that 
abortion should be restricted, as reflected in the 1983 Constitution adopted in a 
referendum passed by a substantial majority.44  
In determining whether the law was proportionate to the aim pursued, the 
Court noted that a State’s margin of appreciation will be narrowed where a 
consensus tends against the measure employed. In this regard, the Court accepted 
that there was ‘indeed a consensus amongst a substantial majority of the 
Contracting States (…) toward allowing abortion on broader grounds than 
accorded under Irish law’,45 and in particular that abortions on health or wellbeing 
                                                             
39 ibid [238]. 
40 ibid [242]. 
41 ibid [230]. 
42 [1976] ECHR 5. 
43A, B & C v Ireland (n 2) [223]. 
44 ibid [226]. 
45 ibid [235]. 
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grounds were available in 40 out of 47 States.46 However, the majority continued 
by reasoning that States enjoy a margin of appreciation as to when life begins (in 
the absence of a European consensus on that point, as highlighted in Vo v 
France).47 As the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus and the mother are 
inextricably linked, ‘the margin of appreciation accorded to a State’s protection of 
the unborn necessarily translates into a margin of appreciation for that State as to 
how it balances the conflicting rights of the mother.’48 Thus, the margin of 
appreciation moves from the subject of the foetus to the subject of the mother, 
restricting the rights-protections that would otherwise, through the European 
consensus permitting abortion on health or wellbeing grounds, be afforded to her. 
As the dissenting judges observed, this approach represented an inappropriate 
conflation of the State’s margin of appreciation regarding the question of when 
life begins (and any consequent right to life of the foetus), and the State’s margin 
of appreciation in weighing the rights claimed on behalf of the foetus against those 
of the mother.49  
The margin having been expanded in this way, the majority cited the ability 
of women to travel outside Ireland for legal abortions (and to receive some 
measure of medical care in Ireland before and after doing so) to conclude that 
Ireland’s restriction was not disproportionate to the aim pursued.50 This ‘exit’ 
factor was considered sufficient to overcome the first and second applicants’ 
strong arguments regarding the substantial inefficacy of the measure (given the 
number of women who travel outside of Ireland to get abortions), and their ‘least-
restrictive measure’ arguments.51 The latter arguments were highly compelling: 
namely the extremity of the chosen sanction of penal servitude for life; the manner 
in which the Irish law amounted to a de facto ban on earlier, safer medical abortion; 
and the way in which compelling women to travel to another country for a time-
sensitive medical procedure increased the anxiety and stigma felt by those who 
did so.52  
Hence, despite rehearsing the strong arguments summoned by the first 
                                                             
46 ibid.  
47 [2004] ECHR 326. 
48 A, B & C v Ireland (n 2) [237]. 
49 ibid [2] (Rozakis, Tulkens, Fura, Hirvelä, Malinverni and Poalelungi JJ). 
50 ibid [239]-[241]. 
51 ibid [239]. 
52 ibid [126]. 
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and second applicants, and recognising the European consensus in favour of less 
restrictive measures, the Court reached the surprising conclusion that the 
prohibition on abortions in Ireland for health or wellbeing reasons was 
proportionate.53 Reading the majority’s reasoning, one is left with the strong 
impression that the ‘morality factor’ has effectively displaced the usual 
proportionality enquiry, although the Court still goes through the motions of the 
analysis. Emblematic of this problem is the Court’s reliance on the strained 
argument that Irish women’s rights under Article 8 are not disproportionately 
restricted because they are permitted to travel outside the State to obtain 
abortions.54 Extending States an expansive margin of appreciation for protecting 
morals in this way risks the impression that the Court’s jurisprudence is 
unpredictable and incoherent. As Lord Lester observes,55 in criticising the 
freedom of expression decisions made in Müller v Switzerland56 and Otto-Preminger-
Institut v Austria,57 if respect for strong moral sensibilities of States is to be the 
touchstone, it is difficult to see why the Court did not afford a similarly wide 
margin of appreciation to British and Irish legislation penalising homosexual acts 
between consenting male adults in the 1980’s in Dudgeon v United Kingdom58 and 
Norris v Ireland.59 It would surely not have been maintainable, in those cases, for 
the Court to conclude that gay men’s rights under Article 8 were not violated 
because they were free to travel elsewhere to carry out their relationships without 
fear of imprisonment. 
A recent decision showing a similar level of deference to local sentiments 
is SAS v France. Here, the majority judges accepted France’s argument that its ban 
on face-coverings pursued the legitimate aim of preserving the conditions of living 
together in society, as an aspect of protecting the rights and freedoms of others 
within the language of Articles 8 and 9.60 As argued by the dissenting judges, 
recognising ‘living together’ as a legitimate aim is problematic in itself because 
there is no recognised right under the Convention to communicate with others in 
                                                             
53 ibid [241]. 
54 ibid [6] (Rozakis, Tulkens, Fura, Hirvelä, Malinverni and Poalelungi JJ). 
55 Lord Lester (n 35) 78. 
56 [1988] ECHR 5. 
57 [1994] ECHR 26. 
58 [1983] ECHR 2. 
59 [1988] ECHR 22. 
60 SAS v France (n 3) [157]. 
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public.61 Living together may be described, in Rivers’ schema, as a pseudo-right.62 
In concluding that a wide margin of appreciation should be extended to France 
in pursuing this aim, the majority noted that France was ‘seeking to protect a 
principle of interaction between individuals which in its view is essential for the 
expression not only of pluralism, but also of tolerance and broadmindedness 
without which there is no democratic society’.63 Here, as in A, B & C v Ireland, 
one can discern an unnecessarily punctilious concern for local traditions and 
practices. In SAS v France, the tradition relied on by the French government may 
be characterised as a muscular version of the Republican values of égalité and 
fraternité, expressed in an overbearing civic culture that demands equal 
participation in social life. As pointed out by the dissenting judges, properly 
understood, the principles of pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness in fact 
entail that States ensure mutual tolerance between opposing groups, rather than 
removing the cause of the tension by eliminating pluralism.64 As in A, B & C v 
Ireland, once the Court has elected to afford a broad margin of appreciation to the 
State on account of local sensitivities, the proportionality analysis that follows is 
deeply unconvincing. The fact that at the time, only two out of 47 European States 
had banned face coverings was denied any substantial weight, as was the 
draconian consequences for women faced with the choice of complying with the 
ban or retreating out of the public sphere.65 Nor was any traction gained by the 
argument that less restrictive measures, such as education campaigns, could 
address the same (as France recognised, numerically-small phenomena) of women 
wearing full-face veils.66 In SAS v France, the Court could have protected the 
neglected ‘liberté’ part of the Republican formula. Instead, the decision represents 
a de facto endorsement of a deeply illiberal policy, directed inward at a minority, 
in the name of liberalism. As argued by Gearty, such outcomes are a problem 
because defeats in human rights cases are not neutral: they can be valuable to 
governments by equipping them with the riposte that regressive measures comply 
with human rights, and so cannot be criticised on that score. 67 
                                                             
61 ibid [5] (Nussberger and Jäderblom JJ). 
62 Letsas (n 12) 48. 
63 SAS v France (n 3) [153]. 
64 ibid [14] (Nussberger and Jäderblom JJ). 
65 ibid [93], [156]. 
66 ibid [24] (Nussberger and Jäderblom JJ). 
67 Gearty (n 6) 118. 
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Each of SAS v France and A, B & C v Ireland can be distinguished from the 
Court’s approach in Lautsi v Italy,68where the Court invoked the margin of 
appreciation to find that a requirement that crucifixes be displayed in school 
classrooms did not violate the right of a mother and her school-aged sons to 
education under Article 2 of Protocol 1 of the Convention. Here the Court 
appropriately concluded that the measure did not rise to the level of an 
interference with the applicants’ right to education, reasoning that in the particular 
Italian context, the school-room crucifixes were essentially passive symbols, 
fundamentally different from didactic religious speech or participation in religious 
activities that could, through indoctrination, threaten that right.69 The facts of this 
case differ substantially from A, B & C v Ireland and SAS v France, where the 
interference with Convention rights was demonstrably serious, demanding a 
careful working through of the proportionality analysis before reaching any 
conclusion that the interference was nonetheless justifiable.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This paper has argued that a universal approach to human rights should be 
pursued as a worthwhile goal, as it represents one of the most powerful tools 
available for protecting individuals. Universalism faces a number of philosophical 
and institutional complications, which are worked through by the Court by 
deploying its various legal tools. The Court’s doctrine of States margin of 
appreciation recognises the institutional reality that the Court must work with 
States to ensure that rights are enforced in Member States in the first instance. 
Once a claim is made, the Court’s proportionality analysis allows it to weigh an 
offended right against competing rights and interests in a fair and deliberate way. 
This paper suggests that when an acute local sensitivity is in play, whether based 
in a particular moral or political tradition, the Court has at times departed from 
its usual proportionality analysis in ways that render its reasoning incoherent and 
unpredictable. Such decisions represent troubling departures from universalism 
that blot the Court’s record of success in calling out violations of rights and 
protecting individuals from the illiberal excesses of government.  
                                                             
68 [2011] ECHR 2412. 
69 ibid [72]. 
